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[I]t became apparent almost immediately, to
many Congressmen and Senators, that here was
a device [RFC] which would enable them to pro-
vide for activities that they favored for which
government funds would be required, but without
any apparent increase in appropriations, and
without passing an appropriations bill of any kind
to accomplish its purposes. After they had done
that, there need be no more appropriations and
its activities could be enlarged indefinitely, as they
were almost to fantastic proportions.
Chester Morrill, former Secretary,
Board of Governors, on the RFC
(cited in Olson [1988], p. 43)
Introduction
The creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) in 1989, the evolution of a "too-big-to-
fail" doctrine within the bank regulatory com-
munity in the 1980s, and more recent recom-
mendations that means of regular government
intervention be created to support some finan-
cial institutions all recall the history of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation (RFC) during
the Great Depression. This paper explores the
lessons learned from our nation's previous large-
scale effort to rescue financial institutions and
discusses their current relevance.
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Then faced with the worst financial crisis in a
century, U.S. policymakers of the 1930s deliber-
ately enacted a set of reforms that included central
bank restructuring, bank regulatory reforms, fed-
eral deposit insurance, and a separate, politically
accountable, publicly funded rescue mechanism,
the RFC. Those policymakers paid careful attention
to statutory and institutional structures that separated
the fiscal policy operations of the debt rescue mech-
anism, the RFC, from the monetary policy operations
of the central bank, which then were dominated by
the Federal Reserve's discount window.
In contrast to most recent proposals for in-
creased levels of government intervention to
fund the capital structures of financial institu-.
tions directly, the RFC had a clearly defined net-
work of checks and balances with respect to both
the activities in which it was authorized to engage
• 1 As used in this paper, "debt rescue," "rescue," and "bailout" are
used interchangeably and might properly be defined as the government's
payment or assumption of a person's debts owed to third parties, without
adequate security for that payment or assumption to ensure that the
government will recover its outlays in full in the near term (currently,
under two years).and the sources of its funding. Yet, despite these
checks and balances, and despite the compara-
tively competent management of the agency for
13 years, the RFC's lending and capital support
operations still became politicized over time.
After the 1946 elections, congressional Republicans
made it one of their first orders of business to begin
the dismantling of the RFC. It would be difficult to
argue that they were wrong to do so (Sprinkel
[1952]). Recent commenters on the RFC have
focused primarily on the desirability and efficiency
of government intervention in financial markets
(Keeton [1992]), rather than on the merits or de-
merits of particular institutional structures for such
intervention, the historic causes of intervention, or
the monetary policy aspects of the 1930s reforms.
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Today, in the search for a governmentally
sponsored financial rescue mechanism, it
would be helpful to review the lessons of his-
tory that bear upon the legal, economic, and
political factors that contributed to the creation
and ultimate demise of the RFC. Particular con-
sideration should be given to the rationale for
the institutional barriers of the 1930s that
separated the RFC's solvency support or capital
replacement mechanisms from both the central
banking functions (the Reserve Banks) and
federal deposit insurance (the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation [FDIC] and, later, the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion [FSLIC]).
Modern advocates of RFC-like schemes either
have ignored or have passed lightly over the rhe-
torical inconsistency between advocacy of free
markets on the one hand, and publicly funded
bailouts of large financial firms on the other. One
specific plan reminiscent of the RFC, prepared by
a group of advisors to New York Governor Mario
Cuomo, was presented to President-elect Clinton
in November 1992 and was described as follows:
[Tlhe report urged the Federal Reserve to play a
far more aggressive role in spurring the economy,
saying it should pump $20 billion in capital into
the nation's banks to make it easier for them to
lend money. But Mr. [Robert] Rubin [Chairman of
Goldman Sachs and a member of the Cuomo
Commission] dissented from that proposal, saying
it would be undue Government interference in
business. (Greenhouse [1992])
Such a proposal would be tantamount to re-
quiring the Federal Reserve today to play the
role of the RFC during the Great Depression in
supporting the solvency or capital structure of
financial institutions. It would also extend the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy function well
beyond its normal roles of ensuring a steady
supply of liquidity to the aggregate economy
and stabilizing the domestic price level.
Even if it were decided to have the federal
government intervene to such an extent in the
private economy, the institutional structure and
legal form of the intervention still would matter
a great deal (see, for example, Sprinkel [1952],
Todd [1988], and Schwartz [1992]). Perhaps the
best argument in favor of a revived RFC is that
keeping the bailout lending device (the RFC)
separate from the monetary policy device (the
Fed and, to a lesser extent, the FDIC) would
both enable monetary policy to be conducted
independent of the bailout function and in-
crease the political accountability to taxpayers
for any publicly funded debt rescue.
An understanding of the RFC's history and in-
stitutional structure should assist policymakers
in decisions regarding the desirability and effi-
ciency of rescuing segments of the financial
services industry. Also, knowledge of the his-
tory of the RFC should predispose policymakers
toward keeping government-funded debt res-
cue operations separate from the Federal
Reserve's monetary policy operations.
I. History of the RFC
Although government intervention in business
operations has a long and involved history, the
classically liberal political philosophy of most
U.S. administrations prior to Herbert Hoover
limited their market interference to relatively few
peacetime interventions until the RFC. The ac-
tual prototype of the RFC was the War Finance
Corporation (WFC), chartered in 1918 to enable
the federal government to centralize, coordinate,
and fund the procurement and supply opera-
tions that accompanied formal U.S. entry into
World War I in April 1917.
3
The WFC was loosely modeled on methods
used by J.P. Morgan & Company to coordinate
and fund the British Treasury's purchases of
U.S. war supplies between January 1915 and
April 1917. The WFC's operations, in turn, were
guided by an Advisory Commission and were
• 2 See, for example, Phillips (1992), Calomiris (1992). and But-
kiewicz(1992).
• 3 See text of War Finance Corporation k:l& Federal Reserve Bulle-
tin, vol. 4 (February 1918), pp. 95-98 (proposed bill), and ibid. (April
1918), pp. 300-06 (bill as enacted). See also Olson (1988), pp. 10-14,
Dos Passos (1962), pp. 219-27, and Clarkson (1924).B 0 X 1
Herbert Hoover's Intentions
for the RFC
Hoover's message to Congress (January 1932) proposed that
RFC funds be used for the following purposes:
(a) to establish and finance a system of agricultural credit
banks ... [ancestors of the Farmers Home Administration];
(b) to make loans to the existing [Federal] Intermediate
Credit Banks ... [part of the Farm Credit Administration];
(c) to make loans to building and loan associations, savings
banks, insurance companies, and other real estate mortgage
agencies so as to enable them to postpone foreclosures [an-
cestor of the Federal National Mortgage Association];
(d) to make loans to banks and financial institutions "which
cannot otherwise secure credit where such advances
will protect the credit structure and stimulate employ-
ment" [emphasis added];
(e) to make loans to the railways to prevent receiverships
[this was in fact the most significant use of the RFC dur-
ing its first year of existence and relieved some of the
biggest banks of some of their most problematic assets—
railroad bonds];
(f) to finance exports that would aid the farmers and the un-
employed [ancestor of the Export-Import Bank];
(g) to finance modernization and construction of industrial
plants and utilities so as to increase employment and
plant efficiency [ancestor of the Defense Plant Corpora-
tion of World War II and of the Defense Production Act
of 1950]; [and]
(h) to make loans to closed banks upon their sound assets
so as to enable them at least partially to pay out deposits
to a multitude of families and small businesses who were
in distress because their deposits were tied up pending
liquidation or reorganization of these banks [emphasis
added] [ancestor of the FDIC's powers under the original
FDIC Act (1933) to speed up payment of liquidation
proceeds to holders of "frozen" bank deposits]. (Hoover
[1952], p. 98)
subject to "preference lists" issued by the War
Industries Board.
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In fall 1931, the onset of the worst part of the
Great Depression, President Hoover proposed
to the Federal Reserve System's Federal Advisory
Council (FAC) the formation of a $500 million
credit pool, to be funded entirely by commer-
cial banks and to have the authority to borrow
another $1 billion, if necessary, for the purpose
of refinancing assets on the books of distressed
banks. Prior to 1932, the Federal Reserve Banks
were not authorized to make advances against
assets other than "real bills" or government se-
curities, and they could not lend for longer than
15 days on the government securities owned by
member banks. The proposed credit pool,
called the National Credit Corporation (NCC),
was to make extraordinary advances until the
December 1931-March 1932 session of Congress
could act upon Hoover's recommendation to
authorize Reserve Banks' emergency advances
for up to 120 days collateralized by government
securities or any other satisfactory assets.
Hoover also proposed to the FAC "... [i]f neces-
sity requires, to recreate the [WFC]... with avail-
able funds sufficient for any emergency in our
credit system."
5 The NCC was organized in Oc-
tober 1931, but was superseded when the RFC
Act was signed into law on January 22, 1932.
Describing his abandonment of free-market
principles to bail out the commercial banking
system, Hoover wrote:
[When I met with a group of Congressional leaders
on October 6, 1931,11 presented a program for
Congressional action if the bankers' movement
[NCC] did not suffice. I hoped those present
would approve my program in order to restore
confidence which was rapidly degenerating into
panic. The group seemed stunned. Only [Speaker
of the House John Nance] Garner and [Senate
Majority (Republican) Leader William] Borah
reserved approval. The others seemed shocked at
the revelation that our government for the first
time in peacetime history might have to intervene
to support private enterprise [in this case, by creat-
ing the RFC]. (Hoover [1952], p. 98)
Although this was hardly the first time that the
U.S. government had supported private enter-
prise through protection, subsidies, or bailouts,
it certainly was the first time that it had done so
on a grand scale in peacetime.
• 4 The WFC was easily the largest-scale effort at central planning in
U.S. history before 1932. See Tansill (1938), pp. 79-81,90-113, Cher-
now (1990), pp. 186-91, Dos Passos (1962), pp. 219-27, Pusey (1974),
p. 216, Clarkson (1924), and Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 4 (1918), pp.
931-34.
• 5 Hoover (1952), pp. 84-98, quotation at p. 98. See also Pusey
(1974), pp. 216-17, and Friedman and Schwartz (1971), p. 320.
• 6 Hoover (1952), pp. 84-98, Friedman and Schwartz (1971), p. 320,
Pusey (1974), pp. 217-19, and Butkiewicz (1992). The official text of
Hoover's statement on the creation of the NCC, together with Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Governor (President) George Harrison's reply, is at Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin, vol. 17 (October 1931), pp. 551-53. A statement by
the organizers of the NCC is at ibid., pp. 555-57. President Hoovefs state-
ment on the RFC and the text of the RFC Act are at Federal Reserve Bulletin,
vol. 18 (February 1932), pp. 89-90,94-99.The original RFC was given a Treasury capital
contribution of $500 million, with initial author-
ity to borrow up to $1.5 billion more "from
either the Treasury or private sources."
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initially asked for $3 billion of RFC borrowing
authority, but that increased amount was not
granted until July 21,1932, when the Emergency
Relief and Construction Act raised the ceiling to
$3-3 billion, of which $300 million was set aside
for unemployment relief (Friedman and Schwartz
[1971], p. 320; Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 18
[1931], pp. 473-74).
Although the original RFC Act was altered
substantially in subsequent years, its main ele-
ments were in place from the beginning, either
in Hoover's original plan or in the modifications
made during the next year. Bailout loans were to
be made not by the central bank (Federal Re-
serve), but instead by this new, separately char-
tered, government-sponsored enterprise, the RFC.
To ensure further structural separation between
the governmental bailout (fiscal) and central bank-
ing (monetary) functions, Section 9 of the RFC Act
provided explicitly that obligations of the RFC
"shall not be eligible for discount or purchase by
any Federal Reserve Bank" {Federal Reserve Bul-
letin, vol. 18 [1932], p. 97). RFC obligations were
issued in the public debt market and counted
both in federal budget receipts and expenditures
and in limitations on federal debt outstanding.
The inauguration of the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration on March 4, 1933, finally enabled a major
change in the RFC's formal powers to occur: The
preferred stock purchasing power was added.
The vehicle for that change was the Emergency
Banking Act, enacted March 9, 1933- The proce-
dures for passage of that bill were extraordinary;
among other things, the House of Representa-
tives had no copy of it.
The Speaker recited the text from the one avail-
able draft, which bore last-minute corrections
scribbled in pencil.... With a unanimous shout,
the House passed the bill, sight unseen, after only
thirty-eight minutes of debate.... The Senate, over
the objections of a small band of progressives
[Senators Lafollette, Borah, Case, Dale, Nye, and
Shipstead, together with Senator Costigan, the
lone Democrat voting no], approved the bill un-
amended 73-7 at 7:30 that evening and at 8:36
that same night it received the President's [Roose-
velt's] signature. (Leuchtenberg [19631, pp. 43-44;
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 19 H9331, p. 115-18
[text of Act])
7 Olson (1988), pp. 37-40.
President Hoover's advisors played a princi-
pal role in preparing the legislation, but the pri-
mary draftsman of the final version was Walter
Wyatt, then general counsel of the Federal Re-
serve Board (Jones [1951], pp. 21-22; Olson
[1988], pp. 37-40). Eugene Meyer, still Governor
of the Federal Reserve Board but no longer Chair-
man of the RFC at the time, and Treasury Secretary
Ogden Mills were the principal Hoover advisors
in this effort (Pusey [1974], pp. 232-38).
Under Section 304 of the Emergency Banking
Act, the RFC was authorized to purchase preferred
stock of banks "in need of funds for capital pur-
poses either in connection with the organization
or reorganization of such [banks]" (Federal Re-
serve Bulletin, vol. 19 [1933], p. 117). Wyatt was
familiar with the issue and could have given the
Reserve Banks a capital replacement or solvency
support role in the draft statute if he had chosen
to do so. But in fact, he gave that role to the RFC,
not to the Reserve Banks.
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When the Roosevelt Administration took over
in March 1933, the leadership and scope of the
RFC also changed. Jesse Jones, a prominent
Houston businessman, was appointed chairman
(Federal Loan Administrator). He already had
served one year as a member of the RFC's board
of directors, participated in the first big bank res-
cue operation of the Depression (the Central
Republic Bank of Chicago borrowed $90 million
from the RFC in June 1932), and managed to
weather the political storm that erupted when
the list of the RFC's borrowers was made public
in August 1932. Jones remained as chairman of
the RFC until January 1945.
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Under Jones, the RFC spent about $50 billion
of the public's money, of which more than $22
• 8 Olson (1988), pp. 38-39, notes that the idea of RFC investment
in the preferred stock of troubled banks was promoted during the spring
and summer of 1932 by, among others, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Governor (President) George Harrison and director Owen D. Young
"because so many banks had capital as well as liquidity problems." By
December 1932, Governor (Chairman) Eugene Meyer of the Federal
Reserve Board, who understood the fiscal/monetary policy distinction
less well than the New York Reserve Bank officials, "began arguing that
either the RFC or Federal Reserve Banks [should] invest in [banks']
preferred stock."
• 9 Jones (1951), pp. 72-83. See generally Olson (1988), Pusey
(1974), pp. 216-26, and Butkiewicz (1992). Morgan (1985), p. 743,
descriDQs the reasons tor Jones's termination as follows,
By the end [of 1944], President Roosevelt decided to fire... [Jones]
largely because Jones had opposed the third term (1940) and fairly
openly supported Dewey (1944). As a consolation prize, FDR offered
to fire Marriner Eccles and to let Jones have the chairmanship of the
Federal Reserve.
See also Jones (1951), pp. 255-311.billion fueled World War II procurement and
production. About $10.5 billion went for the
fight against the Great Depression "without loss
to the taxpayers," if the time value of money
were ignored. The rest of the RFC's funds were
channeled to foreign aid, domestic relief, and post-
war reconstruction and conversion loans to indus-
try. These were significant amounts at the time
because, in 1933, gross national product was only
about $56 billion (the initial appropriation for the
RFC was about 1 percent of GNP, equivalent to
$65 billion today) (Jones [1951], p. 4).
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Jones was both a populistic and a parsimoni-
ous man. In the words of Hyman Minsky, "He
spent the public's money as though it were his
own."
n His overall aim for RFC interventions
in the economy was not to increase central plan-
ning or corporatist control, as some New Deal-
ers understood and intended to practice those
concepts, but rather to exercise his own judg-
ment in producing outcomes roughly analogous
to those that would have been expected had the
markets been left alone. Thus, bankers were re-
quired to reduce their salaries and sometimes to
change managements in exchange for RFC capi-
tal assistance; dividends on common shares
could not be paid until preferred shareholders'
dividends (including those of the RFC) were
• 10 Schiming (1992) notes that, for perspective, the Mercury and
Apollo space program outlays of the 1960s should be compared with RFC
outlays. In the period 1961-1969, total "space research" program outlays in
the federal budget summaries appearing in Federal Reserve Bulletinsme
$34.1 billion, about 3 percent of the final year (1969) GNP. Peak-year outlays
were $5.93 billion in 1966, about 4.5 percent of federal budget outlays, but
still slightly less than 1.0 percent of nominal GNP. Thus, proportionately,
initial-year outlays for the RFC (about 1.0 percent of GNP) exceeded even
peak-year outlays for the Mercury-Apollo space programs.
• 11 Author's conversation with Hyman Minsky, November 22,1991.
See Buchanan and Tullock (1965), Buchanan (1968), Buchanan and
Wagner (1977), Kane (1989), pp. 95-114, Kane (1990), pp. 760-61, and
Greider (1992b) for varying explanations of the rarity of efficient manage-
ment of public funds.
• 12 See Olson (1988), pp. 111-114,173, Greider (1992a), Rohatyn
and Cutler (1991), Willoughby (1992), and Cummins (1992). In contrast
to the kinds of measures that Jones required of bankers receiving RFC
assistance, the Treasury Department during 1992 requested repeal of
analogous provisions regarding salaries and management changes
enacted as part of recent banking legislation (see Rehm [1992], Greider
[1992b], and Willoughby [1992]). A1992 federal housing assistance bill
passed by Congress and expected to be signed by President Bush "toned
down a provision [of the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991] requiring regu-
lators to issue guidelines for executive compensation. Now guidelines
need be issued only to cover unsound institutions." (Garsson [1992b]).
• 13 See Penning (1968), Upham and Lamke (1934), Jones (1951),
Sprinkel (1952), Olson (1988), and Keeton (1992).
paid; and bankers were required to post reason-
ably good collateral and eventually to repay bor-
rowings, typically over 10 years. There was no
hint that the government was making a perma-
nent capital injection into the banks or was mak-
ing a market in their common shares (Jones
[1951], pp. 25-37; Olson [1988], pp. 47-62, 78-
83, 124-127), as some of Jones's New Deal




The high points of RFC operations affecting
the banking industry occurred during 1932 and
just after the bank holiday of March 1933- Of the
17,000 commercial banks in existence going into
the holiday, only 12,000 survived, and half of
those were borrowing some or as much as all of
their capital from the RFC under the preferred
stock provisions of the Emergency Banking Act.
Federal deposit insurance (added in June 1933
as part of the Glass-Steagall Act) did not yet
exist. Almost all large banks, in addition to the
5,000 conservatorships, receiverships, and as-
sisted mergers, funded themselves through the
RFC. With bailout loans to other industries in-
cluded, ranging from insurance companies and
savings and loans to real estate and steel mills,
the RFC became a principal influence on credit
availability in the U.S. economy.
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Over time, the RFC became corrupted by poli-
tics, as Jones came to control enormous patronage.
Between 1947 and 1953, the prevailing opinion in
Washington, particularly among congressional
Republicans, was that central-planning-style in-
terventions in the economy were inefficient
and harmful, and the RFC was phased out. Its
formal operations ceased in 1953, with the final
accounts settled in 1957 (U.S. Treasury [1959],
Sprinkel [1952]). Some of its operations sur-
vived as independent new agencies, like the
Export-Import Bank and the Federal National
Mortgage Association, or as part of ongoing
Cabinet-level departments.
The bailout lending, preferred stock purchas-
ing, and direct or industrial lending powers of
the RFC were not transferred anywhere else—
certainly not to the Federal Reserve, or to the
FDIC prior to 1982—and should be presumed
to have died with the RFC in 1957. No serious
effort was made to revive those powers in Con-
gress until the borrower-specific federal loan
guarantee programs were enacted for Lockheed,
New York City, and Chrysler Corporation during
the 1970s. In those cases, the only role played
by any federal department or agency other than
the Treasury Department, which provided the
guarantees, was the role of fiscal agent explicitlyassigned to the Federal Reserve Banks for the





The RFC embodied six key features that are
relevant to how one might use such an agency
today and, by inference, how one should not
use a central bank.
First, the RFC was explicitly prohibited by
law from funding itself via the Reserve Banks,
either directly or indirectly. This prohibition was
intended to avoid potential conflicts between
the Reserve Banks' central banking (monetary
policy) operations and politically driven bailout
loan requests, which are fiscal policy operations
in the classic models of political economy.
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Second, the RFC also was prohibited from ex-
tending credit to new enterprises trying to enter a
market. Typically, the RFC made loans only to es-
tablished enterprises initiated, set on foot, or un-
dertaken "prior to the adoption of th[e RFC] act."
(RFC Act, section 5, in Federal Reserve Bulletin,
• 14 See Todd (1988) and Schwartz (1992) regarding the evolution
of RFC-like intervention schemes into federal loan guarantees, particular-
ly after 1942. See also Hackley (1973), pp. 133-61. The 1970s' federal
emergency loan guarantee statutory references are Lockheed Corpora-
tion, Public Law No. 92-70 (1971); New York City (first rescue), Public
Law No. 94-143 (1975); New York City (second rescue), Public Law No.
95-339 (1978); and Chrysler Corporation, Public Law No. 96-185
(1979). In addition, the Defense Production Act of 1950,50 U.S.C. Ap-
pendix Sections 2061 et seq., reenacted in 1992, continues authorization
for V-loans, a form of reimbursable loan guarantee program administered
by the Reserve Banks for the Treasury since 1942.
• 15 See Greenspan (1991), pp. 435-36; but see, against his views,
Greenhouse (1992). Chairman Greenspan's views on Federal Reserve
funding of the Treasury's or a deposit insurance fund's obligations are
particularly instructive. Addressing the Bush Administration's early 1991
proposal, with which some members of Congress seemed sympathetic,
to have the Reserve Banks lend up to $25 billion directly to the FDIC's
Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), Chairman Greenspan's remarks were as fol-
lows (source cited):
[A]n element of the Treasury's proposal that has troubled the Board is the use
of the Federal Reserve Banks as the source of these loans. To prevent such
loans from affecting monetary policy, the loans would need to be matched by
sales from the Federal Reserve's portfolio of Treasury securities.... Not only
would use of the Reserve Banks for funding the BIF serve no apparent economic
purpose, it could create potential problems of precedent and perception for the
Federal Reserve. In particular, the proposal involves the Federal Reserve directly
funding the government. The Congress has always severely limited and, more
recently, has forbidden the direct placement ol Treasury debt with the Federal
Reserve, apparently out of concern that such a practice could compromise the
independent conduct of monetary policy and would allow the Treasury to escape
the discipline of selling its debt directly to the market. Implementation of the
proposal could create perceptions, both in the United States and abroad, that
the nature or function of our central bank had been altered. In addition, if im-
plementation of the proposal created a precedent for further loans to the BIF or
to other entities, the liquidity of the Federal Reserve's portfolio could be reduced
sufficiently to create concerns about the ability of the Federal Reserve to control
the supply of reserves and, thereby, to achieve its monetary policy objectives.
vol. 17 [1932], p. 96.) Thus, from a normal, free-
market, procompetitive perspective, the RFC was
interventionist and anticompetitive, providing sub-
sidized credit to existing businesses that was un-
available to new entrants into those lines of
business.
Third, through direct purchases of preferred
stock after March 1933 (Emergency Banking Act,
section 304, in Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 18
[1933], p. 117), the RFC could provide govern-
mental recapitalization of the banking industry in
a way that would be undesirable if undertaken by
a central bank.
1
6 The RFC's preferred stock pur-
chases were one step short of nationalizing the
banking system (see, for example, Phillips [1992]
and Wyatt [1933])- Governmental recapitalization
of the banking industry would amount to de facto
nationalization if there were insufficient collateral
for the government's loans or if there were no
credible schedule for repayment in full of the
government's assistance within a reasonable time,
such as five years (the longest term of Federal
Reserve advances ever explicitly authorized by
statute) or 10 years (the longest statutory term of
RFC assistance).
Fourth, no small part of the success of the
RFC may be due to its leader, Jesse Jones.
Changed times and changed personalities might
make it difficult to appoint anyone comparable
to him today. A czar of banking recapitalization
today would face conflicting choices between
fiscal prudence (reducing spending on the debt
rescue) and fiscal imprudence (increasing
spending on the debt rescue). Either choice
would alienate one set of political constituencies
while pleasing the other set. If enough constit-
uents were alienated by such choices, and if
reappointment accordingly began to appear
politically impossible, then one would have to
view even the initial appointment of another
Jones as highly improbable.
1
7
• 16 The point that it is theoretically improper for a central bank to pro-
vide capital replacement or solvency support for the banking industry is
made explicitly in the report of a conference of South American central bank-
ers that appears in Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 17 (January 1932), p. 45.
The conference report, prepared largely by and under the influence of Federal
Reserve Bank of New York officials, including future president Allan Sproul,
stated that central banks must not in any way supply capital on a permanent
basis either to member banks or to the public, which may lack it for the con-
duct of their business.
• 17 See, for example, Buchanan and Tullock (1965), Buchanan (1968),
and Buchanan and Wagner (1977)—all on "public choice" analysis as it
might apply to this issue—and Greider (1992a, b), Kane (1989), pp. 95-
114, and Kane (1990), pp. 760-61, on the "principal-agent" conflict as
applied specifically to the bank supervision/bank recapitalization problem in
the thrift industry. See also a reference to what now would be called the
"principal-agent" conflict, applied to the RFC, in Olson (1988), p. 43 (quot-
ing Chester Morrill, former secretary of the Board) [prefatory quotation for
this paper].Fifth, for more than one year (January 1932-
March 1933), the RFC operated in an environment
in which there was no deposit insurance and Fed-
eral Reserve notes were convertible into gold. The
FDIC, authorized in June 1933, did not begin oper-
ations until January 1934. Neither of these condi-
tions—an externally constrained central bank and
no deposit insurance—prevails today. The simple
vision of federal deposit insurance in the early and
mid-1950s was the role of a liquidator primed with
cash, not the more extensive role of bank super-
visor and engineer of reorganizations of open
banks that the FDIC plays today (see Penning
[1968] and Todd [1991], pp. 85-90). The actual
experience of the 1930s suggests that the optimal
use of an RFC would be to compensate for the
deficiencies of deposit insurance, where it was
deemed desirable to do so, and to lend in cases
(such as to insolvent banks) that would be danger-
ous for lending by an externally constrained Re-
serve Bank (for example, under a gold standard)
(see Todd [1988,1991]; compare with Epstein and
Ferguson [1984]).
Sixth, because the RFC's finances were exter-
nally constrained, its operations were directly
and politically accountable (initially, through
the office of the Federal Loan Administrator;
later, through the Department of Commerce,
whose chief officer, the Secretary of Commerce,
is a full member of the President's Cabinet).
The external constraint arose from the RFC's in-




In summary, the principal danger posed by
governmental bailout mechanisms, or by a Fed-
eral Reserve that undertakes RFC-like operations,
is that, from public choice theory, we know that
it is difficult for the government to extend credit
directly to selected businesses (already established
ones, at that) and simultaneously to avoid political
pressures to distribute the loans or investments in
a partisan manner or to selectively favored constit-
uencies (see Olson [1988], p. 67, and Buchanan and
Tullock [1965], especially pp. 265-95). In current
• 18 The RFC initially was authorized to issue obligations not in excess
of three times its subscribed capital (originally $500 million) and to borrow
tor not in excess of five years. Its obligations were explicitly guaranteed by
the full faith and credit of the United States (RFC Act, sections 2 and 9, in
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 18 [February 1932], pp. 94,97). Similarly,
obligations of the modern Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) explicitly
carry the full faith and credit of the United States when the principal amount
and maturity date are stated. 12 U.S.C. Section 1441a (j)(3) (1992).
• 19 See, for example, Eichler (1989), Kane (1989), Mayer (1992),
pp. 57-89, and Woodward (1992). Woodward provides a good working
definition of "forbearance": the policy of permitting capital-deficient in-
stitutions to operate under the protection of federal deposit insurance.
discussions, a useful distinction could be made
between an RFC that primarily protected exist-
ing firms (an RFC with a notably corporatist
tinge) and an RFC implementing an industrial
policy that attempted to identify, protect, and
subsidize emerging industries (Schiming [1992]).
It would be better to do neither and to let mar-
ket forces select winners and losers and encour-









The crises that emerged in the thrift and banking
industries in the 1980s prompted a variety of
governmental attempts to either buy time to
allow market-driven corrective forces to work
out a positive solution or prevent further loss of
depositors' confidence that their deposits would
be repaid at par value. Initially, forbearance
seemed to be the mechanism of choice, with the
former FSLIC and the FDIC being authorized in
1982 to issue income maintenance certificates
and net worth certificates to keep insured in-
stitutions open, even if technically insolvent.
1
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The too-big-to-fail doctrine had precursors in
regulatory discussions of the 1970s, but gradually
became fully articulated in the early 1980s. The
doctrine was brought into public debate with the
1984 decisions by both insurance funds to treat
their largest insured institutions as "too big to fail"
because of the generalized loss of depositors' con-
fidence that might be engendered by a closing
without repayment of deposits at par: The FSLIC
preserved American Savings Bank of Stockton,
California ($34 billion total assets), its largest insured
thrift. The FDIC, with funding provided temporarily
by the Federal Reserve, preserved Continental Illi-
nois of Chicago ($41 billion total assets), the tenth-
largest FDIC-insured institution. Both were rescued
even though only small shares of their funding were
provided by their own, retail, insured deposits
(Mayer [1992], pp. 108-15, 254-56; Todd and
Thomson [1990]).
In the case of Continental, the shareholders
of the parent holding company were offered a
settlement initially valued at 20 percent of the
shareholders' equity in the remaining bank,
plus stock options and a contingent claim on
recoveries from liquidations of presumptivelybad assets (Sprague [1986], pp. 186-88, 209-10).
These rescues, which preserved large, insolvent
institutions, were analogous to the role of the
RFC in the 1930s, but they were not done as effi-
ciently or as cheaply as the RFC could have
done them after March 1933, when the preferred
stock purchase plan began. In any case, al-
though there was limited statutory authority for
the FDIC to provide open-bank assistance to
prevent immediate loss to the fund after 1982,
there was no comparable, explicit statutory
authority for other too-big-to-fail actions under-
taken by the commercial banking regulators in
the 1980s. In contrast, the Emergency Banking Act
of 1933 explicitly authorized the RFC to recapitalize
insolvent or marginally solvent banks. The RFC's
power to fund receiverships existed since 1932, and
the comparable power to fund conservatorships
was added by the Emergency Banking Act.
Eventually, in 1989, the thrift crisis of the 1980s
led to the creation of the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (RTC) as a passive liquidator of insolvent in-
stitutions formerly insured by the FSLIC. Although
it appears that the sponsors of the RTC had a
rough model of the RFC in mind, especially its
operations in 1932, the RTC proved to be quite dif-
ferent from the RFC of 1933 and after.
Also, the federal bank regulators' concepts of
too big to fail and systemic risk have continued
to evolve since the RTC was created in 1989- In
this context, "systemic risk" has the meaning
attributed to it in the FDIC Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA) [Section 141 (a)(l)(G)]: a regula-
tory determination that failure to repay uninsured
claims on insured institutions at par "would have
serious adverse effects on economic conditions or
financial stability." The following section evaluates
the effectiveness of the RTC and the continued
evolution of the too-big-to-fail/systemic risk doc-
trines in light of the lessons learned from the




During the 1980s, and particularly after 1982, thrift
industry regulators found themselves in a situation
in which they required a large amount of new
funds to deal with weak institutions in the tradi-
tional manner (closing and liquidating or assisting
with the required mergers of such institutions).
However, neither Congress nor the Executive
Branch was willing to provide the necessary
funds to the FSLIC before 1986, and the amount
finally provided in 1987 ($10.8 billion) proved
inadequate (Mayer [1992], pp. 230-42). Thus,
the thrift regulators were forced to forbear, that
is, to defer events that would force the account-
ing recognition of the economic losses already
accrued to the FSLIC (Kane [1989], pp. 70-114).
The forbearance devices actually used took sev-
eral forms, ranging from decreased frequency
and intensity of examinations to lower capital
requirements and approval of accounting
regimes designed to make embedded losses in
asset portfolios appear to be increases in regu-
latory capital instead (Mayer [1992], pp. 57-115).
Writing on the importance of supervisory for-
bearance as a cause of the thrift industry's col-
lapse in the 1980s, Kane (1989), p. 78, notes:
[Clapital forbearance — which has to an important
extent been forced on FSLIC by Congress, both in
its unwillingness to increase FSLIC's human or
capital resources to handle the surge in client [S&L]
economic insolvencies and in formal limitations
on closure powers enacted in the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987 — served to bifur-
cate the industry into the living and the living
dead. While many of the living have been able to
strengthen their capital position, the zombies
have been getting worse.
Kane also notes the cumulative impact of the
FSLIC's forbearance policies: Between 1982 and
1987, the number of insolvent open institutions
rose from 237 to 515, and the number of insol-
vencies resolved by the FSLIC fell from 247 in
1982 to only 36 in 1984 (Kane [1989], p. 26).
The FDIC and other federal regulators were
simultaneously developing and expanding the
concept of banks "too big to fail," with Conti-
nental Illinois serving as the principal catalyst in
1984. The collapse of nearly all large bank hold-
ing companies in Texas from 1986 until 1989 and
of a few large ones in the Middle Atlantic region
and New England after 1989 gave rise to further
refinements of large-bank failure resolution proce-
dures under the systemic risk doctrine (Todd and
Thomson [1990] and Kaufman [1992]).
The relevance of these developments to
analysis of the RTC depends on the assumptions
that one is prepared to make about the efficacy
of and motives for supervisory behavior during
the 1980s. If, as the authorities cited argue, the
regulatory process had lost its way prior to the
enactment of FDICIA, then too many weak or
failing thrifts and banks were being kept open in-
stead of being closed down and liquidated. The
decisive factor in the political process was that it
was apparently cheaper in the short term to ig-
nore failing bank cases in a fiscal environmentthat simply would not have provided sufficient,
on-budget funding to close weak institutions di-
rectly (see, for example, Kane [1989], pp. 18-22,
and Mayer [1992], pp. 90-115). In hindsight, it
appears that a full-fledged RFC with the capacity
to either recapitalize weak and marginally insol-
vent banks or provide the funding to pay off de-
positors and general creditors would have proved
quite helpful (see Keeton [1992]). But instead, the
eventual government-funded liquidator, the RTC,
was created in 1989 with all of the liabilities but
comparatively few of the asset and funding
powers of the old RFC.
The RTC and the RFC
In August 1989, the RTC was chartered for
seven years to deal with the wave of thrift in-
stitution failures in the late 1980s.
2
0 Like the
RFC, the RTC was intended as a temporary ex-
pedient only, with its authority to administer
new cases to expire in September 1993 and its
charter to expire in 1996. But although the RFC
became an active solvency-support provider
after March 1933, the RTC's role has been
restricted to passive liquidation only—an impor-
tant distinction between the roles of these two
rescue agencies.
Funding the RTC has been problematic. The
initial vehicle was the Resolution Funding Cor-
poration, an entity whose acronym (RFC)
evokes memories of the original rescue agency
of the 1930s. Like the original RFC, the modern
RTC has borrowed funds to enable it to repay
depositors of failed thrifts initially and then has
had to administer assets until resale. The RTC
also has obtained funds through additional,
direct appropriations and through borrowings
for liquidity purposes through the Federal
Financing Bank. The ultimate cost to taxpayers
backing RTC obligations is the difference be-
tween the amounts initially disbursed to repay
depositors and the amounts realized upon even-
tual resale of seized assets, adjusted for ongoing
costs of administration of those assets.
The funding sources of the modern RTC are
more varied, but its cash flow is more con-
strained than that of the old RFC. Both entities
share a common funding restraint: Neither
could borrow at the Federal Reserve Banks.
The 1930s' RFC was authorized to issue its own
debt instruments into the public debt market
(the Federal Financing Bank did not exist until
• 20 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
August 9,1989, Section 501; 12 U.S.C. Section 1441a (1992), as
amended (FIRREA).
1973) and had a substantial amount of positive
cash flow. After all, the RFC did not lend to sig-
nificantly insolvent firms, most of its loans were
short term, and loan repayments and scheduled
preferred stock redemptions provided the cash
flow. The RTC, on the other hand, is required to
fund depositor payoffs for even grossly insol-
vent thrifts and has, by definition, a large portfo-
lio of nonperforming, difficult-to-sell assets. The
RTC's cash flow, other than from asset sales, has
been minimal for several months at this writing.
In fact, it is because of these funding constraints
that some proponents have advocated a role for
the Federal Reserve in any new or expanded
bank or thrift rescue operations (see Green-
house [1992] and Rohatyn and Cutler [1991]).
Although most of the RTC's funding is on-
budget, and although its funding corporation
has issued off-budget bonds (which still count
as part of gross public debt) with maturities as
long as 40 years, the RTC exhausted its avail-
able cash for thrift failure resolutions in March
1992, and Congress still has not appropriated
new funds. Worse yet, as Kane (1990), p. 756,
has noted, there are political and bureaucratic
pressures at work that tend to increase the even-
tual, final, taxpayers' cost of the RTC's opera-
tions, such as the "counterproductive layers of
go-slow administrative restraints [at the RTC]."
(See also Pike and Thomson [1991].)
Two principal lines of argument have emerged
regarding the disposition of RTC assets. One line
argues that the RTC should liquidate its entire port-
folio as quickly as possible, even if that means ini-
tially absorbing large losses from the face value of
its assets, because the losses embedded in the
RTC's portfolio generally will not improve under
government management (Eichler [1989], Kane
[1990], and Pike and Thomson [1991]). Also, the
carrying costs (the accrual of interest on borrowed
funds, maintenance costs regarding real property,
and administrative expenses for a large bureauc-
racy) are sufficiently large that the total cost of the
RTC after five or seven years probably would be
less than if the alternate path were followed.
The second line of argument is that the RTC's
affairs should be managed so as to minimize
nominal losses from face value upon resale of the
properties. This would entail a readiness to ex-
pend necessary sums for maintenance and im-
provements, because borrowing costs currently
are low and because bureaucratic and adminis-
trative expenses should not prove significantly
greater in the near term than those required for a
sales force to liquidate all the properties. Initially,
proponents of this second view argued that the
RTC could become the government's generalmanager for all rescue operations, including res-
cues of nonbank, nonfinancial firms, thereby
more fully mimicking the original RFC (see Mayer
[1992], pp. 260-325, especially pp. 315-18).
In general, this second view, omitting the
proposed role of the RTC as general manager of
all governmental rescues, has dominated RTC
operations thus far, largely because of fears in
regions like Texas and New England that mas-
sive sales of foreclosed real property would fur-
ther depress an already depressed real estate
market. Proponents of the first view argue that
liquidation sales would clear the market and es-
tablish a bottom value for real estate upon
which a sustainable recovery of prices could be
founded—something that cannot occur as long
as there is a substantial amount of real estate in
government hands that overhangs the market
and eventually has to be sold anyway (Mayer
[1992], pp. 260-86, 308-10; compare with
Eichler [1989], pp. 143-46).
Similar matters were argued at great length
during the RFC's operations in the 1930s, with
the central planning/corporate state factions of
the New Deal (such as Rexford G. Tugwell and
Adolf A. Berle) arguing for permanent manage-
ment of assets in the RFC's hands (Schlesinger
[19591, pp. 432-33, and Olson [1988], pp. 111-
14, 173). Jones eventually aligned himself with
the fiscal conservatives (including Senator Carter
Glass, Budget Director Lewis Douglas, and Post-
master General James Farley), who wanted to
return RFC assets to private hands as soon as
possible and eventually to dismantle the RFC.
2
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Cost estimates regarding the modern RTC's
operations vary. The original RFC broke even,
ignoring the time value of money (Jones [1951],
p. 4). But the combined cost of the RTC and
FSLIC resolutions (deadweight loss) is expected
to be about $200 billion at present value, largely
reflecting the difference between failed thrifts'
liabilities paid off at par today and the RTC's re-
coveries on assets sold in the future.
2
2 This loss
represents nearly $2,000 for every individual
income tax return.
It still is generally expected that nearly 900
thrifts (almost one-third of the industry in 1987)
holding more than $400 billion in assets will fail
and be managed by the RTC before its interven-
tion authority expires in September 1993. At the
end of March 1992, when the RTC's available cash
was exhausted, it had disposed of 640 closed insti-
tutions holding $311 billion of total assets, for
which it obtained $202 billion at book value
(Resolution Trust Corporation [1992]).
2
3 The Bush
Administration estimates that an additional $42 bil-
lion of funding, beyond the $80 billion already
appropriated in 1989 and 1991, would be neces-
sary to complete the RTC's operations, in addi-
tion to funding the Southwest Plan deals (see
note 22), with a further $8 billion funding re-
quest for initial capitalization of the Savings As-




A tendency to use central bank resources to
fund a bailout increasingly politicizes the bank's
monetary policy functions, which risks causing
it to resemble the way in which national devel-
opment agencies are used and often abused in
developing countries (providing assistance from
public funds to the most powerful and politically
well-connected entities in the state).
2
4 Gener-
ally, industrial-economy central banks are some-
what insulated from political requests to fund
specific rescue operations. For example, during
1992, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, all industrial
economies, decided to bail out their banking sys-
tems, but they established new governmental
agencies outside their central banks (RFC
analogues) to do so.
2
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Some industrial-economy nations, however,
do use their central banks to fund rescue oper-
ations. The French bankers' association has
• 21 See 0 Ison (1988), pp. 36-37,84-103,173,193; Browder and
Smith (1986), pp. 110-16; and Schlesinger (1960), pp. 515-23.
• 22 This $200 billion estimate of loss is divided between $135 billion
for RTC resolutions and $65 billion for so-called "Southwest Plan" resolu-
tions committed by FSLIC before FIRREA was enacted in 1989. See Mayer
(1992), pp. 249-59, on the Southwest Plan. The $135 billion portion of the
$200 billion estimate is likely to rise again (and the $65 billion portion to fall
somewhat) if short-term interest rates increase. The Congressional Budget
Office also currently estimates the RTC's portion of this cost at $135 billion,
reduced from its $155 billion estimate in late 1991, attributing the reduction
primarily to lower-than-expected interest rates during the past year. See
Garsson (1992a). At this writing, in early December 1992, the Federal
Reserve discount rate is 3.0 percent, as is the federal funds target rate that
the market perceives.
• 23 Using June 30,1992 data provided by RTC regional sales of-
fices, the Southern Finance Project calculated that the RTC was recover-
ing about 55 percent of the book value of commercial real estate assets
sold (Schmidt [1992], Thomas [1992], and Southern Finance Project
[1992]).
• 24 See, for example, the case of the Central Bank of the Philippines,
which assumed the foreign debt of its government's state-sponsored
enterprises in the early 1980s and consequently lost $13 billion on its in-
come statement during 1991, with even greater losses expected during
1992 (LDC Debt Report [1992]). See also Schwartz (1992), Todd (1988,
1991), and Epstein and Ferguson (1984).
• 25 See Brown-Humes (1992), Corrigan (1992), Fossli (1992),
and Taylor (1992).officially asked the French government for assis-
tance with about $15 billion of nonperforming
property loans on the books of the nation's
banks, including "one option proposed ... for
cheap refinancing of troubled loans through the
Bank of France" (Dawkins [1992a, b]). Japan
also has been studying methods for relieving its
banking system of nonperforming real estate
loans without using taxpayers' funds but has not
yet settled upon a final plan (Chandler [1992]).
Some Japanese bankers have requested central
bank assistance in this plan, but the government
has not yet committed such resources to the effort.
In the case of the Federal Reserve Banks, it is
official Federal Reserve policy that Reserve
Banks' advances should not be used to sub-
stitute for the capital of depository institutions
and that Federal Reserve resources should not
be used so as to enable the Treasury to avoid
the discipline of selling its debt instruments into
the open market.26
IV. Conclusions
This paper reviews some of the important lessons
to be learned from the experience of the original
RFC, which was the principal government-funded
bailout agency for both banks and nonbanks from
1932 to 1947. Having tried forbearance and seen it
fail to deal adequately with the thrift industry's
problems after 1982, Congress created the RTC,
which it apparently hoped would resolve those
problems much as the RFC had done in the
1930s. Unfortunately, the RTC has proved to be
a much weaker entity, and it has had no new
appropriations for failure resolutions since
March 1992, with its mandate to deal with new
cases set to expire in September 1993-
When capital replacement problems analogous
to those of the thrift industry began to emerge
in the banking industry in the mid-1980s, regu-
lators initially responded by adopting forbear-
ance policies regarding certain classes of loans
(developing-country debt, agricultural loans,
and commercial real estate) and by articulating
and elaborating on the too-big-to-fail doctrine,
which also produced an offshoot called the sys-
temic risk doctrine. Since the debate began on
FDICIA in 1991, increased attention has been
• 26 Federal Reserve Regulation A, governing use of the Reserve
Banks' discount windows, has provided for nearly 20 years that "Federal
Reserve credit is not a substitute for capital and ordinarily is not available for
extended periods." 12 C.F.R. Section 201.5 (a)(1992). All words in this para-
graph of the regulation following "capital" have been omitted since 1980.
See Greenspan (1991), pp. 434-36, partially quoted in note 15.
paid to RFC-like solutions for the banking indus-
try's problems as well.
Although some authorities still advocate crea-
tion of a new RFC, or the conferral of RFC-like
powers on the Federal Reserve, others oppose
such a measure and express doubt that it would,
in fact, be needed. In retrospect, recreating the
RFC probably would have been a better solution
to both thrift and banking industry problems in
the mid-1980s than what actually was done in
1989 and afterward. However, even the original
RFC with a second Jesse Jones in charge would
have been hard-pressed to function effectively
in the 1980s, when a large number of the institu-
tions to be rescued were grossly insolvent, not
just marginally insolvent or undercapitalized,
and when Congress refused for long periods to
appropriate necessary operating funds for the
eventual rescues.
Remembering the RFC and Jesse Jones fondly
in hindsight tends to cloud the issues that need to
be resolved in any debate about creating a new
RFC or assigning its functions to the Federal
Reserve. Even with a comparably capable man
like Jones running it, the original RFC was not im-
mune from well-founded charges of political
favoritism, corruption, and abuse.
An RFC certainly might prove useful today.
As Keeton (1992) has shown, an RFC can be an
effective way for the government to preserve
financial institutions that otherwise would fail,
but it is doubtful in the present environment that
the government could undertake such rescues
in a way that would maximize long-term effi-
ciency and minimize short-term political con-
siderations. Having the Federal Reserve Banks
provide the funds for such a rescue operation
would only muddy the waters further by reduc-
ing the customary measure of direct political
accountability for such rescue decisions that cur-
rently is obtained through forcing periodic con-
gressional appropriations of new operating funds.
The ultimate objection to RFC-like rescue oper-
ations, and even more to having Reserve Banks
(repositories of the society's common fund of
monetary reserves) fund such rescues, arises from
the incidence of the costs to society from such
operations. Bailouts entail social costs because
they misallocate scarce resources in the direction
of activities that the market, by refusing to fund at
previous levels, already has rejected, regardless of
whether the Fed or a new RFC steps in.
Any revived RFC should be established only
as a temporary rescue device. If it lingers indefi-
nitely, it risks becoming a tool for corporatist
management of the industrial and financial
economies. Jones, for example, saw the RFC asa temporary rescue device to save capitalism.
Still, a new RFC is an idea (albeit an inherently
bad one) worth discussing if the only alternative
permitted by the political process is central-bank-
funded rescues of politically designated target
firms. Any new RFC should be separately char-
tered with a fixed expiration date for its activities
and a comparable deadline for the maturity of
its funding instruments. The RFC should be
funded on-budget and through regular appro-
priations. The Federal Reserve should be pre-
cluded explicitly from funding the RFC, directly
or indirectly, to ensure that institutional checks
and balances remain in place.
Overall, in thinking about ideas for particular
bailouts and bailout devices like the RFC, it is
useful to recall the following wisdom extracted
from 19th-century experiences with the problem
of social cost:
[Policymakers came to understand that] efficiency
and equity required that public subsidies to pri-
vate persons be openly assessed, and not accom-
plished by inattention or concealment.... [W]e had
to learn that the incidence of cost was socially as
important as the fact that cost existed. (Hurst
[1956], p. 105)
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